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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 13 September 1973

1. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and reviewed with him our proposed comments on H. R. 8592. Slatinshek had no problem with submitting as the Agency report the previous report filed by the Agency with the Senate Armed Services Committee on the companion bill, S. 1935. Slatinshek told me also that he has been unable to get with Chairman Nedzi, Intelligence Subcommittee, even though he has been trying. At the moment he does 25X1C not know what the schedule will be for Intelligence Subcommittee hearings.



3. (Confidential - JGO) In response to his earlier request, I called Mike Finley, Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and made a tentative date for briefing of Chairman Fascell; Marian Czarnecki, Chief of Staff of the full Committee; and Finley for Tuesday afternoon, 4:00, in Chairman Fascell's office on developments in Chile. [REDACTED] OCI, has been advised.

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July 27, 1973

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

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MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION ACT OF 1973

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMES A. BURKE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 26, 1973

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 9360) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, for the first time in my 15 years in service as a Member of Congress I voted for cuts in, and finally altogether against, the Mutual Development and Cooperation Act. This vote was cast in a very reluctant manner on my part, done after a great deal of soul searching and examination of the who, what, where, when, why, and hows of the overseas policies of our Government. In the past 18 months we have had two official devaluations and one unofficial devaluation of the dollar as a result of foreign countries raising the value of their currencies. This has had a most disturbing effect on our economy, the result of which has been the extreme disruption of our monetary policies, the skyrocketing of prices, and an almost uncontrollable increase in our interest rates. This administration seems to have placed itself in a hopeless position, unable to cope with these inflationary problems whose conditions appear to worsen instead of improve with each passing day. In light of this untenable situation, I was compelled to register my vote of opposition to this legislation as a mark of protest. I am not against foreign assistance per se, in fact, I feel there is a great deal we can do in this area if properly administered. In fact, had I felt that the aid and assistance we were voting on was reaching down to the impoverished peoples of the world I would have had no reluctance whatsoever in voting to approve that act. Every shred of evidence we have in our possession, however, points to the contrary.

With monstrous national deficits, with the dollar dwindling away in its value, with high rates of unemployment and the high cost of welfare, and with the staggering burdens facing those on fixed incomes, I make specific reference here to the elderly of our Nation who are being forced to live in real misery and deprivation, with these concerns in mind I could not in good conscience vote for this bill. There comes a time when we must stop, look, and listen and that time is here.

There is great debate ongoing about the abuse of power in the executive department of Government and this bill embodies further extensions of authority to the Executive which I do not believe the President is entitled to have. Last year the Congress passed a law establishing a Joint Study Committee on Budget Control. I am a member of that committee and in that capacity I feel that I have a responsibility in this area. I regret having to oppose my good friend and esteemed colleague, the honorable

Dr. THOMAS E. MORGAN, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on this bill.

In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, where we have the highest unemployment rates in the Nation, we have recently witnessed Department of Defense decisions to exercise sharp meatax cutbacks which will result in the loss of 35,000 jobs. Other indiscriminate national policies have contributed to excessively high and unjustified rates of unemployment not only in Massachusetts but in the neighboring State of Rhode Island as well. Thousands of people have swollen the unemployment roles and they can attribute their predicament directly to these policies. Great hardships have resulted in the 11th District of Massachusetts, indeed in the entire Northeast section of the country, because of these policies. In the face of meatax cuts like these taking place in America without the national administration stopping even one moment to consider the economic impact of their decisions, then I say there is but one alternative for us, the duly elected Representatives of the people, and that is to question each and every spending policy of this Government. As I stated at the outset, I was reluctant to cast this vote; however, I shall continue to do a lot of soul searching and I shall continue to investigate, examine, and scrutinize all questions on future spending policies of this country particularly where they seem to run counterclockwise to the spending policies in selective areas of the Nation. I refer specifically and unequivocally to the administration's unfair attitude toward the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I hope and trust that I will be able to vote for foreign aid and assistance programs in the future because I feel that there exists such a need; however, the loosely drawn policies of this administration make it very difficult to do so.

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE PROCEDURES

HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 26, 1973

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday, July 18, the House Committee on Armed Services released its report on H.R. 9286, the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1974. I would like to compliment my colleague from Colorado, the Honorable PATRICIA SCHROEDER on her additional views which accompanied the committee report and to lend my support to them.

Ms. SCHROEDER demonstrated by her comments a clear insight of committee procedures. She presents valuable criticism of those procedures and suggests possible reforms. Certainly her concern can only improve the currently inadequate method of conducting hearings.

One of the most severe inadequacies which I have experienced and which Ms. SCHROEDER also described is the amount of advance time available to read written testimony. On many occasions I have received written testimony only 24 hours

before the hearing—the minimum time committee procedure requires testimony be made available to Members. This gives too little time to fully read and analyze many of the proposals and arguments presented. I believe Ms. SCHROEDER's suggestion to require written testimony at least 3 days in advance would help to provide the time needed.

Analysis of our national defense program is virtually impossible without the assistance of the committee staff. The staff, while small in comparison to the Pentagon, often provides assistance to Member generally favorable to the military. Those of us who have been critical of our defense program have found that the committee staff has often failed to provide necessary assistance to our office staffs. Criticism of our current defense program is not a disservice to the country. The failure to meet the responsibility to review programs thoroughly is a disservice.

Ms. SCHROEDER's criticisms of the actual hearing process, I believe, are extremely important. Questioning of witnesses should be sharp and debate should be open. It is obvious, though, that much of the responsibility for the lack of such sharp questioning and open debate lies with us, the Members. Instead of acquiescing to the military preoccupation with "more," "bigger" and "faster," the Members should begin to reassert their oversight responsibilities.

The committee's preoccupation with technology, with "bigger" and "better," obscures the committee objective of legislating defense policy. As Ms. SCHROEDER states, the Armed Services Committee seems now to be not much more than the Pentagon's "lobby-on-the-Hill."

I urge my colleagues to read Ms. SCHROEDER's comments which I am pleased to insert into the RECORD:

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE PATRICIA SCHROEDER, DEMOCRAT OF COLORADO

It was with extreme reluctance that I joined the majority of my colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee in voting out the Military Procurement Authorization bill for fiscal year 1974.

My primary objection, aside from specific weapons systems noted in my minority report, centers around what I believe was the deficient manner in which this legislation was prepared. Our national defense program requires more analysis than other aspects of the overall budget, not only because it consumes about 40 percent of our taxes, but because it is presented to our committee by military men rigidly disciplined in what opinions they are permitted to express. This kind of discipline is invaluable on the battlefield, but when it comes to determining national defense priorities and strategies, it can frustrate the work of the committee.

The situation is not helped by the fact that the relatively small staff of the House Armed Services Committee, no matter how good its intentions, cannot adequately cope with a multi-billion dollar weapons procurement program that, I understand, is prepared by some 30,000 Defense Department employees with a huge computer system at their command. Nevertheless, the committee made no effort to supplement its staff, to hire outside authorities or to seek its own computer services. Rarely during the long process of hearings which I attended did the committee, or the staff, make the kind of comprehensive effort to master the separate parts of the program, or even to challenge

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it as a whole (or in part), that I believe should have been made.

Unfortunately, the committee seemed to prefer spending its time in a cursory review of individual weapons systems—a “once over lightly” approach—simply deleting a bit here and adding a bit there. Some members gave the impression that doing the hard and tedious work of analysis and criticism of our complicated military program is somehow unseemingly, unmilitary—indeed, unpatriotic.

Rarely during all the hearings I attended were the basic assumptions behind many weapons systems ever questioned. Nor was there adequate discussion of basic national security questions which would allow committee members an opportunity to evaluate a particular weapons system with any sense of perspective. The committee often seemed preoccupied with the technology of a particular weapons system—asking whether a weapon was “bigger” or “faster” than the previous model—rather than with the larger long-range prospective of whether or not the weapon was needed in the first place. We are all subject to this fixation with technology but must not let it become our sole area of inquiry.

To me this preoccupation with “more” and “bigger” and “faster” is dangerous thinking. Those with such a limited vision of our military requirements end up, I believe, doing more harm than good to this country. They are like those French politicians who thought a bigger Maginot Line would provide more defense. They are like our own nuclear strategists who argue that killing an enemy 15 times over makes us more secure than if we can kill him only five times over. They remind me, to use a non-military example, of those people who believe we would honor George Washington more if we increased the height of his monument.

The committee seemed annoyed, even frightened, of vigorous and open debate. The inordinate use of secrecy is a major weapon to suppress debate. In my brief tenure on the committee it became clear to me that the excessive use of executive sessions, from which the public is barred, and the Pentagon’s heavy-handed use of classification stamps, is designed more to keep information from the American public than from any of the country’s enemies.

Two examples come to mind of the trepidation with which the committee views the prospect of full and vigorous debate. First, the number of witnesses favorable to the Pentagon’s point of view who came before the Seapower Subcommittee, for instance, numbered at least 30, while those critical of the program numbered only two. Generally, the 30 witnesses were seldom pressed and their judgment was rarely questioned. The two critical witnesses, on the other hand, were treated in an indifferent manner and their arguments dismissed by many committee members.

The other example concerns the showing during an open Seapower Subcommittee hearing of the NBC-TV documentary film on the CVN-70 nuclear carrier. Some members of the full committee, not just members of the Seapower Subcommittee, felt sufficient concern over the showing of this film that they put in an appearance to criticize it. By all measures it was a balanced presentation, but senior members castigated it as, and I quote, “a diatribe,” “unfair,” “snide,” “destructive,” “damnable” and “poisonous.” These are strong words for men who should look at all sides of a question before they decide.

None of this is conducive to opening up the legislative process so that the committee can examine the proposals in a thorough and competent manner. As a freshman member of this committee, clearly I cannot presume to have mastered the intricacies of such a com-

plicated multibillion dollar bill as this one. But I have observed the process and procedures of the committee sufficiently to believe that they should—indeed, must—be improved.

The committee must welcome open and vigorous debate. Such openness would soon result, I believe, in reestablishing the committee’s independence of action and judgment over legislation for which it has responsibility. As it stands now, the committee is not much more than the Pentagon’s lobby-on-the-hill.

The refusal to open up committee proceedings is, in fact, a serious mistake because it promotes many unhealthy trends. Some members, for instance, have all but abdicated their critical faculties to the so-called Pentagon “experts”; the vision of many committee members is obscured by the shine of military brass; and there are far too many others who take any criticism at all as a personal affront.

After attending all the hearings I could, after asking questions, listening intently and seeking answers, I confess that I am still somewhat in the dark regarding the weapons systems themselves, their costs, and the role they are and/or should (or should not) be playing in our national defense program. Part of the blame obviously lies with me, for in retrospect I could probably have dug even a little deeper worked even longer hours, asked even more questions and demanded even more answers. But the bulk of the blame, in my opinion, lies with a hearing process and procedures that restrict debate, stifle criticism and leave unanswered important questions.

The result is a piece of legislation whose implications and true costs no one on the committee, I fear, fully understands.

It is not my purpose here to criticize the integrity and sincerity of individual members. Many spent long hours listening and reviewing the testimony that was presented. There are other members of the committee, both senior and junior, whose experience and judgment I respect and cherish. My criticism is directed solely to the procedures and practices of the committee, and the debilitating side effects, which I am convinced deter the committee from doing its job properly.

The ideal situation, in my opinion, would be one in which all hearings were adversary in nature. As I see it, the military should present its case, and the committee should receive it with considerable skepticism. The questioning should be sharp and the debate free and open. It should be permitted for written questions to be submitted for the military to answer. It would be healthy for the committee to hear differing opinions within the military establishment itself, as we witnessed briefly (and no doubt by accident) when factions within the Navy clashed openly in hearings on the 8th and 12th of June over a request for two additional DIGNs. Indeed, it should be the policy of the Pentagon to encourage open and public debate within its own ranks. Having its program accepted each year should be a trial by fire for the Pentagon rather than the cake-walk which it is today.

The ideal would include requiring all written testimony at least three days in advance so that our time is not wasted having the witness read it to us. Perhaps more hearings should be held so that we could spend more time understanding and examining the proposals. We would also benefit from the use of more staff, outside consultants and the use of computers. Instead of acquiescing to the military, the House Armed Services Committee should take the lead, as it did in the case of the nuclear Navy.

Reasonable men—and women—should be able to differ not only philosophically but on the means we seek to achieve a common goal. I believe that opening up the proce-

dure and letting in the cleansing light of criticism and debate will not only enhance the committee’s stature but even produce superior legislation. Indeed, the development and maintenance of a strong, flexible and healthy military defense program require that this be so.

MCPL REPORT ON CVN-70

HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER
OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 26, 1973

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I want to share with my colleagues the excellent report prepared by Congressman BINGHAM for Members of Congress for Peace Through Law on the proposed nuclear carrier CVN-70. I will be offering an amendment to delete the \$657 million authorization for this carrier when the House considers H.R. 9286 next week. The report follows:

RESEARCH REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVN-70)

SUMMARY CONCLUSION

At a cost conservatively estimated at one billion dollars, CVN-70 adds only a small fraction to the U.S. capacity for air power at sea. The U.S. capacity already dominates all the other navies of the world combined, and will continue to do so, even without new construction, into the 1980s.

When the cost of the nuclear-powered ships which are required to provide CVN-70 with a protective escort of comparable endurance and sea-keeping capability are included, and when the cost of CVN-70’s air group is added to the total, the total initial cost of this program will reach about three billion dollars. This figure does not include the staggering cost of operation and maintenance and periodic replacement of aircraft. The marginal addition to national security provided by such a nuclear task force is incommensurate with its cost, especially in view of the existing and projected lead held by the U.S. in this type of military power.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the CVN-70 project be cancelled and that the \$657 million dollars requested in the FY 1974 Department of Defense budget request be deleted. The Navy should make every effort to find alternative uses for the items already on order as long lead-time items.

Description of CVN-70

If built, CVN-70 would be the Navy’s fourth nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier. It would be the third Nimitz class carrier, the first two of which are still under construction. Current Navy planning calls for an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) date of 1981.

The specifications for CVN-70 are as follows:

Displacement: 94,400 tons;
Length, 1,092 feet;
Estimated Speed: 36 knots;
Crew (approximate): 5,000.

This new nuclear attack carrier is expected to support an air group of some 100 aircraft. This air group would consist of a number of different aircraft types: fighters (for combat air patrol [CAP] or protection of the carrier and its escorts against air attack); anti-submarine warfare aircraft (to protect the carrier task force against enemy submarines); fighter-bombers (for projecting air power inland from the seas); support aircraft (such as the carrier on-board delivery [COD] aircraft); rescue aircraft (principally helicopters); and reconnaissance aircraft for photographic or electronic surveillance missions.